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Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral World*
IGNACIO N. COFONE** & ADRIANA Z. ROBERTSON***
On March 28, 2017, Congress killed the FCC’s attempt to protect consumer privacy on
the internet and allowed ISPs to continue to track their users’ online behavior. We
evaluate the impact of this decision for consumer privacy in light of biased beliefs and
information overload. We do so through a well-documented behavioral bias: Nonbelief in the Law of Large Numbers. In doing so, we provide a framework for
protecting consumer privacy. We then suggest private law and regulatory solutions
to do so in a more effective way than either the current or the now-repealed regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Advertising is the lifeblood of the internet. Two of the largest players
in the online worldAlphabet and Facebookjointly earned 151.6
billion dollars in advertising revenues in 2017. Alphabet, for its part, is
sometimes characterized as an advertising company rather than as a
search company. A major difference between digital advertising and its
more traditional cousin is the ability to personalize content. As an old
adage in marketing goes, “half of advertising spending is wasted. The
problem is that nobody knows which half.”1 A company with more
1. See George Bradt, Wanamaker Was WrongThe Vast Majority of Advertising is Wasted,
FORBES (Sept. 14, 2016, 6:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2016/09/14/
wanamaker-was-wrong-the-vast-majority-of-advertising-is-wasted/#28146de6483b
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information about consumers’ preferences can better target its
advertising, offering more products and services that are tailored to each
consumer’s preferences and interests. This ability to tailor produces
more sales and higher payments for advertising spots compared to nontargeted advertising, increasing revenue for sellers. In turn, it allows
sellers of advertising spacesuch as Facebook and Alphabetto charge
a premium.
For targeted advertising to work, companies need to track people’s
online behavior. One well-known way to do this is through the use of http
cookies, which are small pieces of text sent back and forth between a
server and a user’s internet browser.2 While cookies may be the bestknown form of online tracking, websites have other means at their
disposal, such as fingerprinting (in which a link contains embedded data
showing how a user accessed a particular website)3 or by monitoring
visitors’ IP addresses. The ability to track online user behavior is not
unique to websites. Internet Service Providers (ISP), in particular, can
monitor everything their clients do online while connected to the ISP’s
server.4 ISP tracking begins “at the source” and, therefore, has the
potential to be far more comprehensive than the tracking methods used
by individual websites.5
However, on March 28, 2017, Congress disapproved the FCC’s latest
attempt to protect consumer data privacy on the Internet.6 The Obama
(John Wanamaker supposedly said “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I
don’t know which half.”).
2. HTTP Cookie, MCGILL SCH. COMPUTER SCI., http://cs.mcgill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/
wpcd/wp/h/HTTP_cookie.htm (last visited July 29, 2018).
3. Jonathan R. Mayer & John C. Mitchell, Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology,
2012 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 413, 420 (2012), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6234427.
4. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420
(2009) (“Everything we say, hear, read, or do on the Internet first passes through ISP computers. If
ISPs wanted, they could store it all, compiling a perfect transcript of our online lives. In fact, nothing
in society poses as grave a threat to privacy as the ISP, not even Google, a company whose privacy
practices have received an inordinate amount of criticism and commentary. Although Google collects
a vast amount of personal information about its users, an ISP can always access even more because it
owns and operates a privileged network bottleneck, the only point on the network that sits between a
user and the rest of the Internet. Because of this fact about network design, a user cannot say anything
to Google without saying it first to his ISP, and an ISP can also hear everything a user says to any other
websites like Facebook or eBay, things said that are unobtainable to Google. The potential threat to
privacy from unchecked ISP surveillance surpasses every other threat online.”).
5. See id. at 1438 (“In modern connected life, almost no other entity can access as much personal
information . . . . Because the ISP is the gatewaythe first hopto the Internet, almost any
communication sent to anybody online is accessible first by the ISP . . . . In fact, no other online entity
can watch every one of a user’s activities, making the ISP’s viewpoint uniquely broad.”).
6. See S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (a joint resolution “providing for congressional
disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Federal
Communications Commission relating to ‘Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and
Other Telecommunications Services.’”). The resolution was passed by the House in a 215–205 vote,
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Administration had adopted rules that limited this type of tracking. In
essence, those rules would have required ISPs to obtain explicit opt-in
consent to access, use, or sell certain types of users’ personal
information.7 Congress disapproved the new rules before they came into
force.8
In recent years, there has been a growing chorus calling for further
regulation of consumer data.9 Concerns about consumer privacy are so
prominent that some scholars have argued that the entirety of
information privacy law has been subsumed by consumer contract law,
pushing aside other issues such as privacy torts and the Fourth
Amendment.10 The FCC’s order, in particular, received more than a
quarter of a million filings, almost all of which supported adopting
stronger consumer privacy rules.11
A presumption in classical economic theory is that, in the absence of
transaction costs or market failures, free exchanges between rational
self-interested parties are mutually beneficial and will lead to an efficient
allocation of resources. In theory, this argument should apply just as well
to consumer data as it does to anything else.12 It would follow, then, that
after being passed by the Senate in a 50–48 vote, both along party lines. Actions Overview S.J.Res.
34–115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-joint-resolution/34/actions (last visited July 29, 2018). See generally Cecilia Kang,
Broadband Providers Will Need Permission to Collect Private Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/technology/fcc-tightens-privacy-rules-for-broadbandproviders.html (explaining the FCC proposed rule for a general audience). Note that sometimes, even
if broadband providers are listed as the subject of the regulation, the resolution specifically covered all
ISPs, including mobile and other internet providers. See 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,334 (Dec. 2, 2016).
7. In particular, the rule would have required ISPs to obtain consumer consent before tracking
financial, health, and children’s data, and browsing history specifically for behavioral advertising
purposes. See David Shepardson, Trump Signs Repeal of U.S. Broadband Privacy Rules, REUTERS
(Apr. 3, 2017, 4:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-trump-idUSKBN1752PR
(reporting on the repeal of the FCC Order).
8. See S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017). In that resolution, Congress disapproved of the FCC’s
rule relating to “Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services.” Id. The FCC’s rule included a timeline for stipulating when the different obligations would
come into force, spanning from “90 days” to “twelve months,” with an additional “twelve-month”
period for small providers. 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,319, 87,341, 87,342 (Dec. 2, 2016).
9. See Brian X. Chen, What the Repeal of Online Privacy Protections Means for You, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/technology/personaltech/what-the-repealof-online-privacy-protections-means-for-you.html (reporting on the repeal’s significance for
consumer protection and explaining these demands regarding the repeal of the FCC rules).
10. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting over Privacy: Introduction, 45
J. LEGAL STUD. S1, S1 (2016) (highlighting “a quiet legal transformation whereby the entire area of data
privacy law has been subsumed by consumer contract law”).
11. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
31 FCC Rcd 2,500, 2,635 (Clyburn, Comm’r, approving in part and concurring in part).
12. Indeed, consumer data has been described as being “to this century what oil was to the last
one.” Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21721634-how-it-shaping-up-data-giving-rise-neweconomy (arguing that data is a crucial fuel of the modern economy).

COFONE (FINAL REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

August 2018]

CONSUMER PRIVACY

8/19/2018 2:20 PM

1475

any economic argument for the regulation of the market for consumer
data must begin by showing that (at least) one of these elements fails to
hold. We take up this challenge.
We argue that the existence of a well-established behavioral bias
justifies regulation of consumer data.13 To do so, we augment the formal
model developed in previous work14 with a cognitive bias known as the
“non-belief in the law of large numbers” (NBLLN). We are not the first to
note that consumers may be unable to accurately estimate the marginal
effects that their decisions have on their level of privacy. For example,
Strandburg has argued that uncertainty might prevent individuals from
accurately perceiving their level of privacy loss.15 While we agree with this
general conclusion, our analysis focuses on the effect of a specific,
well-defined, behavioral bias.
People affected by this bias suffer from a form of information
overload, causing them to misunderstand how quickly an observer can
piece together clues based on available information. Adding this type of
information overload to our model of an otherwise rational and selfinterested agent causes the agent to undervalue her personal data. As a
result, she will sell too much of her data at too low a price, leading to an
inefficiently low level of consumer privacy in the economy. This result
follows without assuming any other transaction costs or other market
failures.
In addition to providing a rationale for the regulation of consumer
data, our proposal provides regulators with insight into how best to
regulate this market. In particular, it suggests that, counterintuitively,
changing defaults from an “opt-out” to an “opt-in” model is unlikely to
have much of an effect. On the other hand, mandatory disclosures

13. This is not to say that there cannot also be rational reasons why individuals might give up
more data than they would in a very simple market with no externalities. For example, suppose that a
customer believes that the online partysuch as her ISPcan use data from its other consumers to
make highly reliable inferences about her. In this case, the incremental loss of her privacy from giving
up her own data might be quite small. In this example, because the online party can make strong
inferences across individuals, there is a negative externality from each individual’s decision to give up
data. This negative externality leads to an inefficiently high level of data sharing. We thank Ed
Iacobucci for this insight.
14. Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1049–58
(2018).
15. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference
Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 96 (2013) (“Internet users do not know the ‘prices’ they are
paying for products and services supported by behavioral advertising because they cannot reasonably
estimate the marginal disutility that particular instances of data collection impose on them.”); see also
Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options At All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1072–74 (1999) (addressing the problems that the
behavioral advertising business model involves for internet consumers seeking to properly estimate
the costs of data collection).
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regarding how informative particular pieces of data will be can help to
increase the overall efficiency of the market for consumer data.
Our approach also helps to address a related concept known as the
privacy paradox. This paradox can be summarized by the following
question: why is it that individuals consistently indicate that they value
privacy, while simultaneously giving their privacy away for almost
nothing?16 We show that a consumer affected by NBLLN will act in a
manner that is consistent with the privacy paradox.
The remainder of our argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, we
survey the landscape of consumer privacy in the digital world. We begin
by discussing prior policy interventions in the internet privacy space,
including the recently disapproved FCC internet privacy rules. We also
discuss some of the major economic arguments for and against
regulatory interventions. Finally, we introduce the well-known privacy
paradox, and argue that NBLLN can help to reconcile this paradox.
In Part II, we present a model of privacy loss and introduce our
formal model of NBLLN. We then show how NBLLN can lead individuals
to undervalue their personal data. This undervaluation, and the
mispricing that follows from it, is particularly acute in the context of
tracking by ISPs, and provides an economic argument for government
intervention in the digital privacy space.
In Part III, we discuss the implications of these findings for policy
makers. After surveying potential private law solutions, we argue that
regulatory solutions are more appropriate in overcoming NBLLN. We
then suggest how to shape future regulatory solutions in the face of
NBLLN and offer specific policy recommendations.
I. CONSUMER PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL WORLD
A. THE FCC PRIVACY ORDER
On December 2, 2016, the FCC took an unprecedented step towards
protecting consumer data from the prying eyes of their Internet Service
Providers. It did so by publishing an Order, entitled “Protecting the
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services,” (“FCC Privacy Order”) extending “traditional [regulatory]

16. See Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure
Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100, 100 (2007) (exploring “the privacy paradox,”
which refers to “the relationship between individuals’ intentions to disclose personal information and
their actual personal information disclosure behaviors.”); see also Alessandro Acquisti et al., The
Economics of Privacy, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 39–41 (2016) (surveying the economics of privacy
and reviewing the literature on the privacy paradox).
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privacy requirements” to ISPs.17 The FCC had previously classified
broadband internet access as telecommunications in its Open Internet
Order.18 According to the FCC, this meant that ISPs were subject to
section 222 of the Communications Act, which requires
telecommunications carriers to protect their users’ personal
information.19 The FCC Privacy Order then applied the consumer privacy
requirements of the Communications Act to ISPs.20 In doing so, the FCC
Privacy Order added ISPs to the group of companies obligated to abide
by a set of duties. We classify these duties into two categories:
“transparency duties” and “consent duties.”
The transparency duties centered largely around disclosure to
consumers and regulators. For example, ISPs would have been required
to incorporate breach notifications, as well as persistent notices about the
information collected, including information on how the data could be
used and with whom it could be shared.21 This included notifying
consumers about the types of information being collected, how the
information was being collected, the purposes for which the ISP would
use or share the information, and the types of entities with whom the ISP
would share the information. ISPs would also have been required to take
reasonable measures to secure consumers’ personal information based
on guidelines set out by the FCC.22 The transparency rules also prohibited
ISPs from requiring consumers to waive their privacy rights as a
condition of service. This would have prevented ISPs from offering a
17. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
81 Fed. Reg. 87,274 (Dec. 2, 2016) (now codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) [hereinafter FCC Privacy Order].
18. See Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,192, 59,214 (Sept. 23, 2011) (now codified
at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (establishing non-discrimination online through § 8.1 on purpose, § 8.3 on
transparency, § 8.5 on blocking, and § 8.7 on no unreasonable discrimination); see also Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd 14,986, 14,988
(Dortch, Sec’y, Policy Statement). (establishing the four principles of the open internet: (i) “consumers
[deserve] access to the lawful Internet content of their choice”; (ii) “consumers [should be allowed] to
run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement”; (iii)
“consumers [should be able] to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network”;
and (iv) “consumers [deserve to choose their] network providers, application and service providers,
and content providers of choice”).
19. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2008).
20. FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, at 87,328–87,329, 87,333, 87,343–87,344. Note that the
rule did not include services that the FTC has authority over (like websites, mobile applications, and
other services of broadband providers), government surveillance, or law enforcement activities. See
generally FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, 87,274, 87,276 (“In this Report and Order (Order) we
apply the privacy requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act) to the most
significant communications technology of todaybroadband Internet access service (BIAS.)”.
21. FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, at 87,312–87,315 (indicating that affected consumers and
the FCC had to be notified, and, under certain circumstances, the FBI and the Secret Service should
have been notified as well).
22. FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, at 87,327–87,328 (providing guidelines (rather than a
checklist) on how to operationalize this and relied on FTC best practices).
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“take it or leave it” contract, which would have left consumers with no
choice but to consent to their data being used or shared for commercial
purposes to receive service.
In contrast, the consent duties were focused on obtaining either optin or opt-out consent from consumers in various contexts. ISPs would
have been required to obtain opt-in consent in order to use or share
sensitive information, and to obtain opt-out consent in order to use or
share non-sensitive information. The rules established wide categories
for sensitive information, such as geolocation, financial information,
health information, children’s information, social security numbers, web
browsing history, app usage history and content of communications.
Non-sensitive information, in contrast, was defined as all personally
identifiable information that did not fall under one of the categories
captured by the definition of sensitive information, such as consumers’
contact information. The consent duties also required ISPs to provide
enhanced notice and obtain affirmative consent in order to use
consumers’ personal information in exchange for financial incentives.23
According to the FCC’s news release, the rules aimed to “ensure
broadband customers have meaningful choice, greater transparency and
strong security protections for their personal information collected by
ISPs.”24 The idea was that, by broadening the framework of consumer
consent to ISPs and calibrating it to information sensitivity, the FCC
Privacy Order would regulate them in a manner consistent with the FTC
privacy rules and the Administration’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.25
The consent rules were both more important and more controversial
than the transparency rules.26 By the end of January 2017before
23. FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, at 87,317–87,318. This provision included heightened
disclosure duties for the “pay for privacy” plans, and also required explicit affirmative consent from
consumers. The FCC would have analyzed these programs on a case-by-case basis.
24. Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Adopts Privacy Rules to Give Broadband
Consumers Increased Choice, Transparency and Security for Their Personal Data (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-341937A1.pdf.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 31 FCC Rcd 2,500, 2,638 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting) (agreeing with his fellow commissioners’
previous statements that “consumers should not have to be network engineers to understand who is
collecting their data and they should not have to be lawyers to determine if their information is
protected,” but finding that the FCC’s order dramatically departed from this
principle); see also THE FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, WC DOCKET NO. 16-106, FACT SHEET: THE FCC ADOPTS
ORDER TO GIVE BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION
(2016),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-rules-protect-broadband-consumer-privacy
(last visited July 29, 2018). There were some exceptions to the duty to obtain consent before using
personal information, although they were limited. Id. at 2. Only non-sensitive information
(information that would necessarily be provided to the broadband service), information used to
provide and market services and equipment (such as use of a modem) typically marketed with the
broadband, and information needed to protect the ISP from fraudulent use of its network were
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Congress disapproved the rulethe FCC had received almost a quarter
of a million filings from individuals in support of the FCC Privacy Order,
as well as eleven petitions to reconsider.27 Nine associations submitted a
joint petition for a stay,28 which was opposed by a group of eleven
consumer associations in February 2017.29
ISPs argued that the FCC Privacy Order would be both costly and
burdensome to implement.30 More importantly, the ISPs maintained
that they had already devised a set of voluntary “privacy and data security
principles,” which “include a commitment to take reasonable measures
to protect customer information from unauthorized use, disclosure, or
access, taking into account the nature and scope of their activities, the
sensitivity of the data, the size of the ISP, and technical feasibility.”31
Acting pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, Congress
subsequently undid this protection. Specifically, Congress passed a joint
resolution that provided for the disapproval of the regulation, which
President Trump signed into law on April 3, 2017.32 Because this was
done under the Congressional Review Act,33 not only did the resolution
kill the FCC’s pending protections, it also prohibited federal agencies
from passing any substantively similar regulation under current law.34 As
excluded from the duty to obtain consent. Id. Arguably, the most important and contentious of these
were the mandate to obtain opt-in consent for sensitive information and the mandate to provide users
with an opt-out for non-sensitive information. See id.
27. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
32 FCC Rcd 1,793, (2017) (order granting stay petition in part).
28. Id.
29. Joint Opposition to Petition to Stay Final Rule: Protecting the Privacy of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services (Feb. 3, 2017), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
02/2-3-17-Opposition-to-Stay_Comment.pdf.
30. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
supra note 27, at 3.
31. Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
supra note 27, at 3.
32. Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–22, 131 Stat. 88 (2017) (“Congress disapproves the rule
submitted by the Federal Communications Commission relating to ‘Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’ (81 Fed. Reg. 87274 (Dec. 2, 2016)),
and such rule shall have no force or effect.”); see also Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Online
Privacy
Protections
from
Obama
Era,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/trump-repeal-online-privacy-protections.html
(reporting on the process through which, “President Trump on Monday signed a congressional
resolution to complete the overturning of internet privacy protections created by the Federal
Communications Commission”).
33. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (1996). The Act includes the Congressional
Disapproval Procedure, which allows Congress to issue a joint resolution that rescinds a regulation
within sixty days of the regulation’s promulgation date. See § 802.
34. By May 2017, the 115th Congress had rescinded fourteen regulations pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act. See Act of Feb. 14, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017) (rescinding
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49359 (July 27, 2016), a rule
submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission); Act of Feb. 16, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–5, 131
Stat. 10 (2017) (rescinding Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93066 (Dec. 20, 2016), submitted by
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a result, Congress has effectively barred the FCC from creating other
similar consumer-protection rules regulating ISPs. Moreover, because
ISPs continue to be classified as common carriers, they are excluded from
the FTC Act and remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC.35
Therefore, the FTC lacks the jurisdiction to impose its own privacy
regulations.36

the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement of the Department of the Interior); Act of
Feb. 28, 2017, Pub. L. No. 11–8, 131 Stat. 15 (2017) (rescinding Implementation of the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91702 (Dec. 19, 2016), submitted by the Social
Security Administration); Act of Mar. 27, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–11, 131 Stat. 75 (2017) (rescinding
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 58562 (Aug. 25, 2016), submitted by the Department of
Defense, the General Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration); Act of Mar. 27, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–12, 131 Stat. 76 (2017) (rescinding Resource
Management Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 89580 (Dec. 12, 2016), submitted by the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of the Interior); Act of Mar. 27, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–13, 131 Stat. 77
(2017) (rescinding Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 81 Fed. Reg. 86076 (Nov. 29,
2016), submitted by the Department of Education); Act of Mar. 27, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–14, 131 Stat.
78 (2017) (rescinding Teacher Preparation Issues, 81 Fed. Reg. 75494 (Oct. 31, 2016), submitted by
the Department of Education); Act of Mar. 31, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–17, 131 Stat. 81 (2017) (rescinding
Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program; Middle-Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act
of 2012 Provision on Establishing Appropriate Occupations for Drug Testing of Unemployment
Compensation Applicants, 81 Fed. Reg. 50298 (Aug. 1, 2016), submitted by the Department of Labor);
Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–20, 131 Stat. 86 (2017) (rescinding Non-Subsistence Take of
Wildlife, and Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska, 81
Fed. Reg. 52247 (Aug. 5, 2016), submitted by the Department of the Interior); Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115–21, 131 Stat. 87 (2017) (rescinding Clarification of Employer’s Continuing Obligation to
Make and Maintain an Accurate Record of Each Recordable Injury and Illness, 81 Fed. Reg. 91792
(Dec. 19, 2016), submitted by the Department of Labor); Act of Apr. 13, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–24, 131
Stat 90 (2017) (rescinding Savings Arrangements Established by Qualified State Political Subdivisions
for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 92639 (Dec. 20, 2016), submitted by the Department
of Labor); Act of May 12, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–33, 131 Stat. 845 (2017) (rescinding Metropolitan
Planning Organization Coordination and Planning Area Reform, 81 Fed. Reg. 93448 (Dec. 20, 2016),
submitted by the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration); Act of
May 17, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–35, 131 Stat 848 (2017) (rescinding Savings Arrangements Established
by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59464 (Aug. 30, 2016), submitted by the
Department of Labor). Prior to January of 2017, this power had been used only once. See Act of Mar.
20, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (disapproving a rule from the Department of Labor
relating to ergonomics).
35. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (excepting from FTC
regulation “common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce”); see also Calli Schroeder, The
AT&T v. FTC Common Carrier Ruling Creates a Regulatory “Blind Spot,” INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY
PROFESSIONALS (Sept. 2, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-att-v-ftc-common-carrier-ruling-andhow-it-changes-common-carrier-regulation/ (reporting on the implications for privacy of the U.S.
Circuit Court ruling that common carriers are exempt from all FTC Act Section 5 actions).
36. However, the FCC can still regulate ISPs through the Communications Act, even similarly to
how the FTC regulates internet based companies, as long as these regulations are not deemed
substantively similar to the FCC Privacy Order. See supra note 33, at § 801(b)(2) (“A rule that does
not take effect . . . may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is
substantially the same . . . may not be issued . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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B. PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF ISPS
Most of the central arguments made opposing the FCC Privacy
Order were unpersuasive. The four most common of these were that: (i)
having two agencies involved in the regulation of digital privacy would
create confusion for consumers; (ii) it would stifle innovation; (iii) it
would raise costs, which could in turn lead to increased prices for
consumers, and; (iv) by restricting consumers’ ability to trade their
online data for other services, it would reduce consumer choice.37 As it
turns out, these arguments largely echo the arguments made a year
earlier against net neutrality, which, for the most part, were simply a
slight modification of the generic arguments against any regulation.
In the midst of these boilerplate concerns, one argument stands out:
That the FCC Privacy Order was unfair for two reasons. First, because it
regulated one sector of the behavioral advertising market (ISPs) more
than others (websites) and, second, because it created barriers to entry
for companies (ISPs) that might have wished to compete with nearly
monopolistic incumbents (Alphabet and Facebook).38 While this
argument is superficially plausible, it misses the mark. While it is
certainly the case that Alphabet, Facebook, and other websites collect
vast amounts of personal data, the amount that they can collect is far less
than what is available to an ISP. Moreover, even if each ISP has a smaller
market share than Alphabet or Facebook in the overall market, for many
consumers, ISPs operate as de facto monopolists. Depending on her
place of residence, a consumer might be able to choose between only two
ISPs or, in some cases, have no choice at all.39
37. See Jeff Flake, Settling a Bureaucratic Turf War in Online Privacy Rules, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
1, 2017, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/settling-a-bureaucratic-turf-war-in-online-privacyrules-1488413165 (using equivalent arguments and, on occasion, similar phrasing, to the letter of
support from the White House and the letter sent to Congress by the industry coalition); see also
Kimberly Kindy, How Congress Dismantled Federal Internet Privacy Rules, WASH. POST
(May 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-congress-dismantled-federalinternet-privacy-rules/2017/05/29/7ad06e14-2f5b-11e7-8674-437ddb6e813e_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.d4611d684368 (reviewing the arguments in favor of the measure).
38. See Letter from Jacquelyne Fleming, Asst. Vice President-Fed. Regulatory, AT&T, to Marlene
H.
Dortch,
Sec’y,
Fed.
Commc’n
Comm’n
(June
28,
2016),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1042634095372/WISPA%20Rebuttal%20Ex%20Parte_Final.pdf (“The
proposed marketing restrictions would irrationally protect market incumbents [e.g., Google and
Facebook] against competition from new entrants [ISPs] in the digital advertising market.”)
[hereinafter Letter to the FCC]; see also Larry Downes, Why Congress’s Rejection of Proposed FCC
Data Rules Will Not Affect Your Privacy in the Slightest, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2017/03/30/why-congresss-rejection-of-proposed-fccdata-rules-will-not-affect-your-privacy-in-the-slightest/.
39. According to the most recently available data from the FCC, only 43.5% of the US population
was serviced by three or more broadband providers offering 25/3 Mbps speed or greater. 33% of
Americans had access to services from 2 providers, and a further 19% had access to services from only
1 provider. Compare Broadband Availability in Different Areas, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N
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Further undermining this argument is the fact that under the status
quo, companies that run websitessuch as Alphabet and Facebookare
subject to FTC privacy regulations. Since the Fair Credit Reporting Act
was passed in the 1970s, the FTC has been the agency primarily
responsible for protecting consumer privacy.40 In addition to enforcing
statutory privacy laws, the FTC regularly publishes Privacy Reports and
works to advance consumer privacy policy in the marketplace. Common
carriers, however, fall outside the “marketplace” for regulatory purposes,
and are therefore beyond the reach of FTC regulations and enforcement.
These entities are instead regulated by their specific agencies, such as the
FCC.41 Because of their unique social and economic role, common
carriers are generally subject to more stringent regulations than other
private companies.42 As a result, one would expect that classifying ISPs
as common carriers, and thereby moving them from FTC to FCC
jurisdiction, would result in them being subject to more regulationas
are telecommunication companiescompared to their private
counterparts regulated by the FTC.
This is not what has happened. Ironically, as a result of Congress’s
disapproval,43 ISPs, as common carriers, are now subject to less stringent
privacy regulations than their non-common carrier counterparts in the
digital world. Perhaps more ironic is the fact that ISPs are positioned to
collect far more information than their non-common carrier digital
counterparts. Unlike, for example, Alphabet, ISPs have many sources of
individuals’ personal information. Alphabet can only gather information
about an individual consumer when she is using its websites (such as its
search engine www.google.com) and other products and services (for
example, its web-based email service Gmail or its Chrome web browser).
On the other hand, that consumer’s ISP can, in principle, see everything
that she does on both her computer and her smartphone. It can see every
URL she visits, along with every video and song she streams, and every
(last
updated
Dec.
2016),
https://broadbandmap.fcc.gov/#/area-comparison?
selectedTech=acfosw&amp%3BselectedSpeed=25_3.
40. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2251 (2015); Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy
Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042 (2000); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 611–12 (D.N.J. 2014).
41. See Ohm, supra note 4, at 1421 (explaining that, while ISPs lack a regulatory framework,
“Congress has already regulated ISP surveillance with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act”).
But see Ohm, supra note 4, at 1478 (“As many courts and scholars have complained, the ECPA is
confusing . . . . The rules are particularly confusing for ISP monitoring, because so many exceptions in
the law apply to providers, and because courts have had little occasion to consider ISP monitoring.”).
42. See generally Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934); see also Rob Frieden, The
FCC’s Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1275, 1281 (2004).
43. See discussion supra Subpart I.A.
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file she downloads.44 By triangulating cellphone signals, it can also collect
data on her location, even if she has disabled her phone’s location
service.45
In other words, at least from a technological standpoint, it is
currently feasible for ISPs to collect, and then sell, a staggering amount
of data about nearly everyone in the United States.46 The limits of these
practices depend only on the current FCC’s interpretation of Title II of
the Communications Act and each ISP’s individual privacy policies.
While perfectly rational agents might be able to bargain for increased
privacy protections if they so desired, individuals affected by NBLLN
cannot comprehend how much privacy they are giving up, and are
therefore unlikely to bargain for increased protection.
Of course, under the status quo, consumers are in theory still able to
opt-out and prevent the ISP from collecting their data in the first place.
But, this is easier said than done. Most privacy enhancing technologies,
such as a virtual private network (“VPN”) or the use of a browser’s
“private” or “incognito” mode, are reasonably effective at limiting
tracking by websites, but are ineffective against tracking by ISPs. The
reason for that is that the benefits of these technologies only appear after
the consumer has connected to the ISP server. Some technologiesfor
example, “Tor” (also called “The Onion Router”)are effective at
masking a user’s identity from the ISP, but they come at the cost of
usability and speed.47 This form of “opt-out” operates by circumventing

44. See Ohm, supra note 4, at 1423 (“An ISP controls a valuable and privileged bottleneck. It owns
the point on the network between a user’s computer and the rest of the Internet . . . . [T]he ISP’s
connection to the end user, is a unique and critical point: the only point through which all of a user’s
communications must pass . . . . [T]he greatest point of control and surveillance.”).
The exception to this, which is the one thing her ISP cannot see, is encrypted communications. This is
the case for any site that has an SSL certificate (htpps sites). When the consumer is in such sites, her
ISP knows that she is at the website, but doesn’t know what she does in it.
45. For an illustration of how this can produce relevant legal consequences, see United States v.
Carpenter, No. 12–20218, 2013 WL 6385838 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2013) (explaining how the
government procured 152 days of historical cell phone location data from Timothy Carpenter as key
evidence for a criminal investigation). See generally Ohm, supra note 4, at 1450 (“Telephone
companies and their employees are sued and criminally charged more often than ISPs, usually for
installing devices such as pen registers, which record telephone numbers dialed from a phone, and
even occasionally for recording voice conversations . . . .”).
46. Note that, despite this technological feasibility, to date, ISPs do not have a record of violating
their users’ privacy. See Ohm, supra note 4, at 1450 (“No reported cases to date have discussed the
liability of an ISP for unlawfully running packet sniffers, except for lawsuits against providers for
supporting government monitoring.”). However, “[t]here are convincing reasons to suspect that
providers have respected privacy only because they have been constrained from doing more[,] . . .
technological barriers to extensive monitoring have fallen significantly.”). Ohm, supra note 4, at 1450.
47. Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (“Using
Tor protects you against a common form of Internet surveillance known as ‘traffic analysis.’ Traffic
analysis can be used to infer who is talking to whom over a public network. Knowing the source and
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the ISP’s efforts to track the user’s online activities. It is only by limiting
tracking and, therefore, the amount of information that the ISP is able to
collect, that a consumer can meaningfully regulate the ISP’s use of that
information.
C. THE FCC PRIVACY ORDER AS A DEFAULT RULE
At the heart of this policy dispute is the classic issue of selecting a
default rule. Default-based policies rely on the status quo bias, which is
the idea that when offered a choice containing a default option, people
tend to remain in that default.48 The effect of the status quo is to create a
default in which ISPs have virtually unrestricted access to their
customers’ personal information. The FCC’s rules would have changed
the default to one in which ISPs would have had to obtain customers’
explicit consent before obtaining, and by extension using, their personal
information. This would have shifted the default from an opt-out rule to
an opt-in rule.
This change would have effectively reversed the interpretation of
silence on the part of the customer. Under the FCC’s disallowed rules, in
order to use a customer’s personal information, ISPs would have first
been required to obtain that customer’s explicit consent.49
Default rules designed to nudge may be either “policy defaults” or
“penalty defaults.” Policy defaults aim to increase the number of people
choosing the default option. Penalty defaults, introduced by Ayres and
Gertner,50 aim to encourage a private party to provide information to
other parties, thereby reducing rent-seeking (obtaining gains by
generating uncompensated losses to others) under information
asymmetries.51
Superficially, the choice of a default rule may seem relatively
unimportant. Unlike a mandatory rule, a default rule is simply a gapfiller, which provides the rules in the event that parties do not supply
their own.52 There is, however, a long line of literature on the importance
of default rules. Default rules are known to be “sticky,” meaning that

destination of your Internet traffic allows others to track your behavior and interests.”) (last visited
July 29, 2018).
48. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 321 (1985).
49. See FCC Privacy Order, supra note 17, at 2506.
50. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
51. See id. at 94; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 736 (1992).
52. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 50.
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parties contract around them far less often than scholars would expect.53
Moreover, law sometimes makes them artificially “stickier” when it
defines the way in which parties can contract around the default legal
treatment.54
The importance of “sticky” defaults may be one reason why an ISP
could, in theory, change its terms of service to restrict its use of this
information. However, to our knowledge, none has.55 We argue that this
phenomenon is compounded by the well-documented fact thatdue to
NBLLNindividuals tend to underestimate their privacy loss in exactly
these sorts of contexts.56
The FCC Privacy Order can be understood as a set of penalty default
rules.57 In the absence of a penalty default or other disclosure rule,
information asymmetries can lead to situations where the more informed
counterparty withholds information from her less-informed counterpart.
Such a reduction is socially inefficient, in the sense that it reduces the
total value (or “surplus”) created by the exchange. As such, by

53. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES,
VALUES AND FRAMES 294 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); David Cohen & Jack L.
Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, 30 OSGOOD HALL
L.J. 737 (1992); Julie S. Downs et al., Strategies for Promoting Healthier Food Choices, 99 AM. ECON.
REV. 159 (2009) (illustrating the power of defaults by showing that the effect is also present in
insurance, food choices, and marketing, where the number of consumers who agree to receive
marketing e-mails increases up to 50% depending on the default); Eric J. Johnson et al., Defaults,
Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2002); Eric J. Johnson
& Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78 TRANSPLANTATION 1713, 1714–15 (2004)
(showing that sticky defaults exist even when the costs of switching away from the default choice are
close to zero); Eric Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives, 302 SCIENCE 1338–1339
(2013) (illustrating the power of defaults by showing that the number of organ donors increases up to
400% in countries where being a donor is the default choice); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197, 199 (1991); Brigitte
Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings
Behavior, 116(4) Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1152 (2001) (illustrating the power of defaults by showing that the
variety of domains in which a status-quo bias exists: adherence to savings plans increases up to 50%
when employees are enrolled automatically); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 44 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default
Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych (May 19, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171343).
54. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2084 (2012) (providing a theory of altering rules and discussing “impeding altering rules,”
which deter some parties from choosing legally disfavored provisions).
55. Under the status quo, customers are still, in theory, able to prevent an ISP from using that
information by preventing the ISP’s efforts to collect the data in the first place. However, as discussed
in Subpart I.B. above, this is easier said than done.
56. See infra Part III.
57. See Ignacio N. Cofone, The Way the Cookie Crumbles: Online Tracking Meets Behavioural
Economics, 25 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 38, 48 (2016); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software
Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 583, 620–21 (2006) (analyzing the similar case of online tracking through http cookies in the
context of default rules).
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withholding information, the more informed party is essentially
destroying value. Despite this value destruction, it is rational for the more
informed party to do so. While the total surplusthe benefit from the
transactionis reduced, the amount of the surplus taken from the less
informed party is larger than the more informed party’s proportional
share of the destroyed surplus. When this happens, a rule encouraging
the party to reveal the information can prevent this self-interested but
destructive behavior, increasing the total social value. Penalty defaults
are intended to do just this and, therefore, can sometimes be used to
counteract incentives to strategically withhold information, just as
presumptions can do so in procedural law.58
D. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR INTERVENTION
Standard economic theory argues that competition leads to efficient
outcomes,59 and that the best thing a government or regulator can do is
to stay out of the way, and at most, help make lump-sum cash transfers
between individuals.60 While this argument has lost some of its luster in
recent decades, economists are generally sympathetic towards the virtues
of markets. In most markets, competition does a good job of ensuring
that the needs of consumers are met. There is also a large literature
pointing out the fact that regulations can have unintended consequences,
and can ultimately harm consumers.61

58. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 50, at 107; see also Cofone, supra note 57, at 48–49.
59. For example, the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (sometimes called simply
the “First Welfare Theorem”) asserts that, under certain conditions, “competitive equilibrium
allocations are Pareto optimal,” meaning that there is no other allocation that can make all parties
better off. TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODELS, AND
OPTIMAL GROWTH THEORY 17, 160–61 (2008). For a proof of the theorem, see id. at 162–63; see also
ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 325–327 (1995).
60. For example, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (sometimes called
simply the “Second Welfare Theorem”) states that, under certain conditions, “[A]ny Pareto optimal
allocation can be achieved as the allocation of a competitive equilibrium after an appropriate lumpsum redistribution of wealth among consumers.” BEWLEY, supra note 59, at 160. For a proof of the
theorem, see BEWLEY, supra note 59, at 172–76; see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 59, at
327–28.
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390 (1994); see also Feng Gao et al., Unintended Consequences of Granting Small Firms
Exemptions from Securities Regulation: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 459
(2009) (finding that exemptions for small firms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have had the
unintended effect of encouraging small firms to stay small); Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer,
Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2006)
(concluding that certain net neutrality requirements had the unintended consequence of reducing
innovation); Ekaterina Jardim et al., Minimum Wage Increases, Wages, and Low-Wage
Employment: Evidence from Seattle (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23532,
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23532 (finding evidence that a minimum wage increase in
Seattle resulted in a reduction in both employment and total payroll in low wage jobs).
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In this standard framework, arguments for market intervention
typically rely on the existence of a market failure. One traditional market
failure is in the realm of public goods. These are goods or services that
are both non-rivalrous in consumption (consumption by one person does
not affect its value to another) and non-excludable (it is very difficult or
impossible to exclude individuals from the benefits of the good or service
once it is being provided), such as national defense.62 Another traditional
cause of market failures is the existence of monopolies, which provides a
basis for antitrust regulation.63
More recently, scholars have begun to point to consumer
irrationality as another potential justification for market intervention.64
While some have expressed skepticism about the increasing prominence
of behavioral economics,65 it is now widely accepted in legal scholarship
that, under the right circumstances, the existence of a sufficiently
prevalent cognitive bias can be grounds for market intervention. In Part
III, we argue that this is the case in the context of internet data privacy.
E. THE PRIVACY PARADOX AND NBLLN
One of the complications in the discussion of consumer data privacy
is known as the privacy paradox. This paradox refers to the fact that,
while individuals say that they are concerned about their privacy, they
are willing to sell or trade this same privacy for almost nothing.66
One response to this paradox is skepticism. When there is a conflict
between what an individual reports and what she does, it may be prudent
to put more weight on what the individual actually does. Statements may
reflect aspirations, while actions may be more likely to reflect tough
tradeoffs made in the face of real life costs and benefits. This is a major
reason why economists and psychologists tend to view actions as much
more informative than words.
This logic of rational decision-making for privacy choices breaks
down in the face of a systematic cognitive bias. If individuals deviate from

62. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45–46 (5th ed. 2007).
63. See id. at 43.
64. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122
YALE L.J. 1826 (2013); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199 (2006); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein,
Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 53.
65. See infra Part II.B.2.
66. See, e.g., H. Brian Holland, Privacy Paradox 2.0, 19 WIDENER L.J. 893, 893 (2010); Norberg
et al., supra note 16, at 100; Eric Jorstad, The Privacy Paradox, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1503, 1503
(2001) (“Americans are ambivalent about privacy.”).
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standard notions of rationalityfor example, because of NBLLNthey
may think that their actions are perfectly consistent with their
statements. The cognitive bias flips the normal situation on its head: it is
the statement, rather than the action, that is a true reflection of the
individual’s preferences.
Rather than dismissing the possibility that consumers act
irrationally when making privacy choices, we consider the possibility that
people making online choices about their personal information might
face this widely recognized cognitive bias. We then explore the
implications of this extended decision-making model, and discuss how
the law can help protect individuals and increase social welfare.
II. PRIVACY LOSS IN THE FACE OF NBLLN
A. OUR MODEL OF PRIVACY LOSS
1.

Types and Clues

In prior work, we presented a model to formalize the concept of
privacy loss based on Bayesian updating.67 Here, we consider a simplified
version of that model, which conveys its main thrust. Consider an
individual named Abby. Abby has a fundamental characteristic. This
might be her height, her willingness to pay for a good, her wealth, her
desirability as an employee, or her intrinsic worth as human being. We
will refer to this as her “type.” Initially only Abby knows her type.
Now consider a company called Poodle. Suppose that initially,
Poodle has no specific information about Abby, but would like to learn
more about her. While Poodle cannot observe Abby’s type directly, it does
have a pretty good idea about what the overall distribution of types in the
population looks like. In addition to the mean and the standard
deviation, it also knows the general shape of the distributionfor
example, whether individuals are pretty evenly spread out across
different types, or whether they tend to be bunched together with only a
few outliers.
Poodle can also observe signals, or clues, that allow it to guess
something about Abby’s type. Each of these clues represents a piece of
information about Abby. While none of these clues fully reveal Abby’s
type on their own, by running analytics on these clues, Poodle can form
a clearer picture about it. Specifically, when it aggregates these clues,
Poodle can form its best guess about Abby’s type. Because it knows that
this is only an informed guess, it still has some uncertainty about her
typeit might guess too high or too low, for example, believing her to be
67. Cofone & Robertson, supra note 14.
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taller or shorter than she actually is. The more uncertain Poodle is about
Abby’s type, the more privacy she has.

Figure 1: Abby’s privacy is higher when the distribution has fatter tails
Figure 1 illustrates this intuition. When Poodle has few signals about
Abby’s type (𝜎=3, the widest, blue curve), it knows that the range of
plausible types is wide. As it gets to know Abby better (moving from the
widest curve to the intermediate, green curve, 𝜎=2), the distribution
becomes narrower, meaning that the range of plausible types narrows.
As it gets to know Abby better still (moving to the narrowest, red curve,
𝜎=1), Poodle has a good idea about what it wants to know about Abby,
and the range of plausible values becomes narrower.
2.

Aggregating Clues

It turns out that, when faced with large amounts of data, the average
person is not particularly good at estimating the informativeness of each
piece of newly arriving information.68 In the context of one’s online data,
this means that individuals will tend to underestimate the amount of
privacy that they are ceding to commercial parties. That is, they might
mistakenly believe that Poodle’s belief about their personal information
does not change much when they provide the company with new
information that is, in fact, still informative. In short, they will
68. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 444 (1972) (famously observing that “[t]he notion
that sampling [standard deviation] decreases in proportion to sample size is apparently not part of
man’s repertoire of intuitions”).
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(mistakenly) think that Poodle cannot learn much from the new
information.69
The upshot of this is that individuals will tend to give away their
private data too easily, or sell it too cheaply. An example can help to
clarify this phenomenon. Suppose that Abby is faced with a decision
about whether to use a new smartphone application. She knows that, as
a condition of using it, she will be granting the company that created the
application, Poodle, access to the data she produces while using it. This
grant of her private data is the price she pays for the applicationshe
effectively sells her data in return for access to the application. While she
realizes that Poodle can use this information to learn about her, if she
suffers from NBLLN, she will underestimate how much Poodle can learn
about her. In particular, she will underestimate the significance of such
data when it is combined with the data that she shares, through a
different application, with a second company, called Goggles. In other
words, she will underestimate her privacy loss, causing her to undervalue
her private data.70 Moreover, this effect will be significantly enhanced if
Poodle and Goggles combine their information about her. As a result, she
will be willing to sell her data too cheaply, and may therefore mistakenly
agree to grant Poodle access to her data. In other words, she may accept
terms that, but for her misunderstanding, she would not accept.
While the effect of NBLLN on an individual’s willingness to sell
private data is not limited to the Internet context, the problem is
particularly acute in the digital domain. The sheer amount of data that
can feasibly be collected in the digital world is exponentially larger than
in the analogue world. Individuals afflicted by NBLLN will therefore have
a particularly hard time understanding just how valuable their digital
data is. These individuals suffer from information overload. As storage
and processing costs continue to fall, and as machine learning algorithms
become more effective, the amount of information that can be extracted
from each data point will only increase, exacerbating this problem
further.

69. This relates to Abby’s perceived number of draws. For example, Abby might give Poodle ten
extra pieces of information (ten signals), mistakenly believing that their effect on Poodle’s posterior is
the same as (or similar to) the effect of giving it three extra pieces of information. In that case, Poodle’s
posterior would be tighter than what Abby believes it to be. If Abby has decreasing marginal utility
over her privacy, then, she will systematically underestimate her privacy harm for each subsequent
signal. We address this in more detail below. See infra note 87.
70. It is also possible that Abby misperceives Poodle’s prior. We address this possibility later in
the analysis. See infra note 87.
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B. NON-BELIEF IN THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS
1.

A Well-Known Bias

Our baseline model of privacy loss was built using standard
statistical principles. In doing so, we implicitly assumed that individuals
are rational Bayesians: they begin with some set of beliefs, and then
update their beliefs based on things that they see in the world. We also
assumed that the more information they see, the more updating they do.
At the extreme, if Poodle observed an infinite number of pieces of
information about Abby, Poodle would know Abby’s type with absolute
certainty. This fundamental statistical principle is known as the Law of
Large Numbers.
It turns out that most humans have very poor intuition when it
comes to fundamental statistical principles. One place where this is
particularly true is with respect to the Law of Large Numbers. For
example, in a famous paper, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that
individuals systematically underestimate how quickly a sample mean
converges to the population mean.71 In one setting, they asked
respondents the following question, which has since become a classic
formulation:
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45
babies are born each day and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are
born each day. As you know, about 50% of all babies are boys. The exact
percentage of baby boys, however, varies from day to day. Sometimes it
may be higher than 50%, sometimes lower.
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which (more/less)
than 60% of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think
recorded more such days?72

Subjects were given three answer options: (i) the larger hospital, (ii)
the smaller hospital, and (iii) about the same (i.e., within 5% of each
other). Respondents were divided into two groups: those who were asked
about days on which more than 60% of babies born were boys, and those
who were asked about days on which less than 60% of babies born were
boys.
Statistically speaking, there is a clear answer to the two questions:
the larger hospital is much more likely to have recorded less than 60%
boys, while the smaller hospital is much more likely to have recorded
more than 60% boys. This is because, as a sample increases, the
likelihood that the sample mean (in the example, the percentage of babies
that are boys) will diverge very much from the true population parameter
(here, 50%) drops fairly rapidly. Moreover, because of the statistical
71. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 68, at 437–445.
72. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 68, at 443.
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phenomenon known as the Law of Large Numbers, as the sample size
approaches infinity, the probability that the sample mean will diverge
from the true parameter at all falls to zero.73
While this statistical fact is well established, applying it requires
considerable mental effort, and does not appear to come naturally to
individuals. In Kahneman and Tversky’s original study, the majority of
respondents incorrectly answered that the probabilities were about the
same, despite the fact that the larger hospital is three times the size of the
smaller one. In fact, even more worrisome, for both groups, the correct
answer was actually the least popular choice.
Benjamin et al. summarize Kahneman and Tversky’s findings as
evidence that, “experimental subjects seem to think sample proportions
reflect a ‘universal sampling distribution,’ virtually neglecting sample
size.”74 As a result, these individuals systematically over-estimate the
level of uncertaintythis is, the standard deviation of the sampling
distributionfor large samples. In the context of online data privacy, this
bias implies that an individual like Abby will tend to underestimate how
much a company like Poodle can learn about her by analyzing her online
behavior, leading her to undervalue her private data. Benjamin et al. go
on to develop a relatively tractable75 mathematical model of NBLLN.76
We adopt this framework for our analysis of the effects of NBLLN on
privacy loss. We are the first to apply this concept to the privacy context.
2.

Addressing Concerns About Behavioral Economics

A common critique of behavioral economics is that psychologists
have documented a great many cognitive biases, many of which ought to
act in conflicting directions. As a result, critics argue, it is often difficult
to determine both which biases are most important in any particular
context, and how important any particular bias ought to be.77 We also
recognize the concern that researchers may be tempted to rummage
around in a psychology textbook until they find a bias that suits their
story.
While we recognize and share these concerns, neither of these
critiques are compelling in this context. First, there is strong evidence
73. See ROBERT V. HOGG ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 204 (6th ed. 2005)
(discussing the law of large numbers).
74. Daniel J. Benjamin et al., A Model of Nonbelief in the Law of Large Numbers, 14 J. EUR. ECON.
ASS’N 515, 516 (2016).
75. This tractability is very important in attempting to model NBLLN. Precisely because it is so
fundamental to statistical reasoning, it is rather difficult to construct a model without relying on the
Law of Large Numbers. This in turn makes it difficult to model an individual who suffers from NBLLN
and explains the importance of the work of Benjamin et al.
76. Benjamin et al., supra note 74.
77. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2015).
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that NBLLN is among the most prevalent behavioral factors in the
population. For example, in a recent large-scale study involving 1500
participants drawn from a representative panel of U.S. adults, Stango et
al. studied the incidence of seventeen different widely recognized
“behavioral factors,” including NBLLN.78 They report that 87% of the
participants in their study exhibited NBLLN.79 This suggests that a huge
proportion of the population is vulnerable to this bias, which should
reassure any skeptical reader that NBLLN is not a fringe issue. Rather, it
appears to be the dominant way that individuals think about how
information aggregates. There is therefore a solid basis for believing that
NBLLN plays a substantial role in the realm of online consumer data
privacy, and that it could also be driving the well-known privacy paradox.
Moreover, our prior model is explicitly premised upon the
individual’s ability to judge the degree to which the standard deviation of
the probability distribution of someone’s belief over target person’s type
shrinks around its mean value.80 This may be the most important
assumption of the model. NBLLN explicitly undermines this assumption
in a way that is particularly relevant in a context in which people release
many small pieces of informationprecisely the context of
privacyrelevant internet interactions. It is therefore important from a
conceptual perspective to explore the consequences of this bias.
C. NBLLN AND PRIVACY LOSS
1.

Formalization

We begin by formalizing the application of Benjamin et al.’s model
of NBLLN81 to our model of privacy loss.82 This provides the formal
mathematical justification for our argument. We then discuss the
intuition behind this formalization.
Suppose that instead of Abby, we have two individuals named
Tommy and Sam. Sam is Tommy’s irrational alter ego. The two are
identical in every way but one. Tommy is a Bayesianhe correctly

78. Victor Stango et al., The Quest for Parsimony in Behavioral Economics: New Methods and
Evidence on Three Fronts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23057, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23057.
79. See id. Table 4. This makes NBLLN the second most prevalent behavioral factor from among
these seventeen factors, after violation of the general axiom of revealed preference (“GARP”). Id.
80. See Figure 1.
81. Benjamin et al., supra note 74.
82. Cofone & Robertson, supra note 14. In contrast to that paper, where we defined privacy loss
in terms of standard deviations, here we use the variance of the observers sampling distribution. This
is done solely for expositional convenience. Variance is simply standard deviation squared, and
working directly with variances allows us to omit additional notation. Moreover, because neither can
be negative, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two concepts.
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perceives Poodle’s posterior distribution. Sam, on the other hand, suffers
from NBLLN.
In particular, suppose that individuals can be represented by a type
θ on the interval (0,1). Poodle is able to observe binary signals about
Tommy and Sam, which take a value of either y or n. These signals could
represent the person’s decision about whether or not to stream a
particular song, download a particular file, or click on a particular link.
The signals are independent and identically distributed (iid) Bernulli
draws, where the probability of observing y is θ, leading to a “θ-binomial”
distribution of the mean. Tommy understands this, just as he
understands that the variance of this distribution decreases at a rate of
1/N. As N gets very large, Tommy understands that this variance goes to
zero. Sam, on the other hand, believes (falsely) that this variance never
goes to zero. In particular, following Benjamin et al.,83 Sam believes that
as N gets large, the distribution will converge to a “𝛽-binomial
distribution” for some 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] that is itself drawn from a distribution
with mean θ. Denote this distribution, called Sam’s “subjective rate,” by
𝑆
𝑓𝛽|Θ
.
Benjamin et al. prove that, under relatively mild assumptions,84 Sam
and Tommy will both perceive the mean of Poodle’s distribution
correctly. While Sam correctly understands that the variance of Poodle’s
posterior is decreasing in N, for any N > 1 he believes that Poodle’s
distribution is wider than it really is.
Formally, Tommy understands that, for a sample size N, Poodle’s
posterior variance is given by
𝜎𝑁2 𝑇 =

𝜎2
𝑁

=

𝜃(1−𝜃)
𝑁

.

However, Sam incorrectly believes that the posterior variance is
given by

𝜎𝑁2 𝑆 =

𝜎2
𝑁

+

𝑁−1
𝑆
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
]
𝑁

=

𝜃(1−𝜃)
𝑁

+

𝑁−1
N

𝑆
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
].

𝑆
For the remainder this is analysis, we will assume that 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
] is
independent of N.
Now suppose that Sam and Tommy are both considering “selling” a
clump of N signals to Poodle for a fixed price per signal. How many

83. See generally Benjamin et al., supra note 74.
84. See Benjamin et al., supra note 74, at 521–22 (noting the model’s assumptions).
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signals will each be prepared to sell at that price? Standard economic
theory indicates that they will be prepared to sell signals up to the point
where their marginal disutility from giving up the privacy associated with
the signals is equal to the payment offered on the last signal.
We begin by computing Tommy’s marginal utility loss from giving
up a signal. Since utility is defined over the variance of Poodle’s
distribution, and this variance is a function of N, we apply the chain rule85
to find that
2𝑇
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
𝜕𝑁

=

2𝑇
2𝑇
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
) 𝜕𝜎𝑁
2
𝑇
𝜕𝜎𝑁
𝜕𝑁

=

2𝑇
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
) −𝜃(1−𝜃)
.
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁 𝑇
𝑁2

Sam’s marginal utility loss, in contrast, is given by
2𝑆
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
𝜕𝑁

=

2𝑆
2𝑆
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
) 𝜕𝜎𝑁
2
𝑆
𝜕𝜎𝑁
𝜕𝑁

=

2 𝑆 −𝜃(1−𝜃)+𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓 𝑆 ]
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
𝛽|Θ
,
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁 𝑆
𝑁2

𝑆
where 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
] < 𝜃(1 − 𝜃).86

Now, suppose that Sam is beginning from the “correct” starting
point. Even though he suffers from NBLLN, his beliefs have “caught up,”
in the sense that he does understand how much Poodle knows about him.
In that case,
2𝑇
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁 𝑇

=

𝑆
Since 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
] > 0, and

2𝑆
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁 𝑆

2
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁

=

2
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
.
2
𝜕𝜎𝑁

> 0, it follows that the absolute

value of Sam’s marginal utility loss is smaller (closer to zero) than
Tommy’s. Sam is therefore willing to sell the signals more cheaply than
Tommy is or, alternatively, is willing to sell more signals than Tommy is
for a given price B.87

85. The chain rule is a method for finding the derivative of composite functions and is a
fundamental tool of calculus. See GILBERT STRANG, CALCULUS 154–56 (1991) (discussing the chain
rule).
86. See generally Benjamin et al., Appendix to: “A Model of Non-Belief in the Law of Large
Numbers” (Mar. 23, 2014), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rabin/files/barney2014.pdf (presenting
the proof).
87. Things get more complicated if Sam hasn’t yet realized the true variance of the distribution.
In this case, 𝜎𝑁2 𝑆 > 𝜎𝑁2 𝑇 . If we assume that utility is concave, this implies that
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Intuition

While the mathematics behind our formalization draw on fairly
advanced statistical concepts, the intuition is very simple. Like
Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental subjects, Sam doesn’t make the
connection between the size of a pool of data and the precision of the
estimates that can be made based on that pool. While he recognizes that
the more data you have to look at, the more accurate your estimates based
on that data will be, he fails to recognize how quickly the level of precision
of these estimates increases. When Sam downloads Poodle’s app and
accepts its terms of service, he might realize that he is granting Poodle
access to his geolocation data. What he may not realize is just how much
Poodle can learn about him from that information alone. For example,
the app could record the fact that, every weekday morning, he travels at
walking pace from 2nd Avenue and 88th Street over to 86th and
Lexington before moving at high speed to 59th and Lexington. He then
moves at walking speed to 59th and Fifth. Every weekday evening, he
reverses the trip. Based on this alone, Poodle can infer where Sam lives
and works, and that he commutes by subway. Similarly, his geo-location
data between the hours of 11:30 am and 1:30 pm will reveal his lunch
routine, just as his location between 6:30 pm and 9:00 pm reveal where
he likes to eat dinner. Along the way, the app will collect data that it can
use to learn about his shopping habits, his hobbies, and who he socializes
with.
In our example, Sam might be horrified to learn this. While he was
willing to accept the terms of service, he did so only because he did not
2𝑇
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
2𝑇
𝜕𝜎𝑁

>

2𝑆
𝜕𝑈(𝜎𝑁
)
2𝑆
𝜕𝜎𝑁

.

This exacerbates the problem: not only does Sam misperceive the effect of an additional signal on the
variance of Poodle’s posterior, he also misperceives where he is in his own utility function. At the same
time, however, this is a countervailing effectif Sam really misperceives the starting point of Poodle’s
posterior, he will also overestimate the impact of a signal on Poodle’s posterior. This follows from the
fact that
2𝑆
𝜕2 (𝜎𝑁
)

𝜕𝑁2

=

𝑆
2[𝜃(1−𝜃)−𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑓𝛽|Θ
]]

𝑁3

> 0.

In other words, while 𝜎𝑁2 𝑆 is decreasing in N, it does so at a decreasing rate.
As a result, the marginal effect of an incremental signal is larger when the variance is larger. If Sam
thinks the variance of Poodle’s distribution is larger than it really is, he might actually overestimate
the effect of an additional signal. In the abstract, it is impossible to know which effect will dominate.
This generates two related problems. First, Sam, and others like him, is underpricing his private
information. Second, while Sam does not realize immediately how much privacy he has left, there is a
good chance that, eventually, he will. When he does, he will suffer a severe loss. At the same time,
however, the fact that Sam begins by overestimating the variance of Poodle’s posterior means that he
will overestimate the degree to which an individual signal will affect his privacy. This third effect might
offset the first two, leading to indeterminate outcomes.
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realize what he was accepting. His lack of understanding, moreover, is
driven not by the fact that he did not read the policy, or even that he did
not understand the words being used. Rather, the cause of his
misunderstanding is that he systematically underestimates how much
information can be gleaned from a given set of clues.
III. ADDRESSING BIASED BELIEFS AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
This analysis does more than provide an explanation for the privacy
paradox. It also indicates a failure in the market for consumer privacy
and provides an economic rationale for regulating consumer privacy. The
more consumers need to aggregate information in order to gauge the
value of the personal data that they are releasing, the more relevant this
rationale will be. Because it is hard to imagine a context in which this is
more relevant than that of ISP tracking, it is ironic that ISP tracking is
one of the least regulated consumer privacy interactions.
Under normal conditions, standard economic theory suggests that
trades are welfare enhancing. If privacy were like fruit, this conclusion
would also apply.88 Under normal conditions, if Abby has an apple and
Poodle has a banana, Abby will only agree to trade with Poodle if she
values the banana more than she values the apple. Otherwise, short of
coercion or deceit, she will decline to trade. This simple but powerful idea
can also be applied to more complex situations. For example, instead of
apples and bananas, Abby might have private information about herself,
and Poodle might be offering her the right to use its app. Unfortunately,
cognitive biases such as NBLLN complicate matters further.
If Abby suffers from NBLLN (as Sam did in Part II.C.), this
effectively means that she does not realize how much she values her own
information. Going back to fruit, it is almost as if she thought she was
only trading one apple for one banana, when in fact she was trading a
whole bushel of apples. The risk is clear. Abby may be agreeing to a trade
that, had she fully understood the situation, she likely would not have
agreed to.
Moreover, if there are lots of people like Abby in the worldpeople
who have a hard time distinguishing between a single apple and a bushel
of themit is easy to see how we might end up with a whole lot of apples
88. Of course, there are reasons to believe that privacy is not like fruit. See Strandburg, supra note
15, at 95 (explaining why the release of personal data in exchange for goods and services is not a typical
market and arguing that, “In a functioning market, payment of a given price signals consumer demand
for particular good and services, transmitting consumer preferences to producers. Data collection
would serve as ‘payment’ in that critical sense only if its transfer from users to collectors adequately
signaled user preferences for online goods and services”).

COFONE (FINAL REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE)

1498

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/19/2018 2:20 PM

[Vol. 69:1471

being sold by the Abbys of the world to the Poodles of the world. The
Abbys of the world would end up selling off far more apples than they
meant to sell, and far more apples than would have been sold in an
efficient market with fully rational participants. This is a key problem for
consumer privacy in a behavioral world.
There are two ways in which the law can address this problem. The
first is to tackle it through private law, and particularly the law of
contracts. The second is to tackle it through direct regulationlike the
FCC attempted to do. We evaluate both of these possibilities.
B. PRIVATE LAW APPROACHES
While we have already shown that free contracting will lead to
inefficient outcomes, one way to approach this problem is through
contract law principles. Contract law has devised ways to address
behavioral biases in standard form contracts, chiefly through the
doctrine of unconscionability.89 Unconscionability has traditionally been
divided into two parts: procedural and substantive.90 Procedural
unconscionability deals with defects in bargaining or contract formation
process in a way that is more flexible than other doctrines such as duress,
fraud, or incapacity.91 Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand,
allows a judge to void an otherwise valid contract based solely on the fact
that the terms of the contract are unfair or oppressive.92 While these two
concepts are distinct, they are often discussed in tandem.
Russell Korobkin has criticized the modern doctrine of
unconscionability as insufficient to the task of dealing with the effect of
certain behavioral biasesgrouped under the umbrella of bounded
rationalityin the context of standard form contracts.93 Korobkin’s
critiques can also be applied in the context of NBLLN consumers and
data privacy.94 Moreover, Alan Schwartz has argued persuasively that
cognitive errors should be irrelevant to an unconscionability finding, and

89. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An
Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between
Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006); Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and
Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117 (2007).
90. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the CodeThe Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 485–489 (1967) (presenting the classic treatment of the unconscionability doctrine).
91. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 507 (5th ed. 2013).
92. Id.
93. Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1255–78.
94. While “bounded rationality” is a general term used to describe individuals who do not
perfectly process all available information, NBLLN is a much more precise cognitive bias. We can
therefore interpret NBLLN as one particular type of bounded rationality.
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suggests that courts are particularly poorly positioned to evaluate issues
related to cognitive biases.95
The issue of institutional competence is particularly concerning in
the context of consumer data privacy involving NBLLN. Not only are
judges poorly situated to evaluate whether disclosures are sufficiently
clear and comprehensible to an NBLLN consumer, an analysis of the
substantive terms of the contract would be infeasible. In order for a judge
to make a finding of substantive unconscionability in this context, she
would have to determine, for each individual consumer, that the amount
of personal data being traded was “too large” relative to the benefit that
the consumer received. This is a herculean task. After all, as we have
discussed, the value of each piece of information about Abby depends
crucially on the amount of other information that is already known about
her.
Indeed, in order to use substantive unconscionability to solve the
problems created by NBLLN, a judge would have to make an
individualized determination for each affected consumer, in light of all
the other information already available. Given the number of individuals
affected by each standard form data privacy agreement, such an
individualized analysis is impractical. Perhaps more importantly, given
the prevalence of NBLLN,96 there is little reason to believe that a judge
would be any better at evaluating the true extent of Abby’s privacy loss
than she is.
Finally, even if these issues could be addressed, there remains
another, larger problem that is unique to the context of data privacy: once
a consumer’s data has been used to learn more about that person, it is
virtually impossible to force the user to “unlearn” it. Unconscionability,
which is concerned with nullifying a contract ex post, is therefore poorly
suited to address contracts when the concern is about privacy harms.
An alternative, albeit related, private law approach to this issue is
through the doctrine of unilateral mistake. While courts are less likely to
grant relief in cases of unilateral mistake than they are in cases of mutual
mistake, “[t]here is practically universal agreement that, if the material
mistake of one party was caused by the other, either purposely or
innocently, or was known by the other or was of such character and
accompanied by such circumstances that the other had reason to know
of it, the mistaken party has the power to avoid the contract.”97
While NBLLN is a well-recognized and pervasive behavioral bias, it
is unclear whether a court would use the doctrine to set aside an NBLLN
95. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 1410.
96. See supra Subpart II.B.2.
97. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.41 (rev. ed. 2002).
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consumer’s acceptance of a data privacy agreement. The discussion in the
prior Part makes clear that the NBLLN consumer does not fully
appreciate what she is giving away.98 As previously discussed, it is as
though she thought she was only trading away one apple, when in fact
she was giving up a whole bushel of them.99 This can be analogized to the
classic case of Hume v. United States, in which the U.S. government
entered into a contract to purchase shucks from Hume for 60 cents per
pound.100 According to the Supreme Court, this was a clerical error, and
the intended price was sixty cents per hundred weight (i.e., per hundred
pounds, or 0.6 cents per pound).101 The Court held that if Hume knew or
should have known about the error, the contract should be set aside.102
While a cognitive error is distinct from a clerical one, it is not
obvious that they should be treated differently by the law. Moreover,
given the overwhelming evidence of the NBLLN bias in the population,
ISPs should be aware that consumers are unable to properly estimate the
degree of privacy loss that they will experience, just as Hume should have
known about the clerical error.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this doctrinal approach, we do not
believe that the doctrine of unilateral mistake is an appropriate solution
to the problem. In this context, it suffers from the same limitations as the
doctrine of unconscionability.103 Courts are poorly placed to evaluate the
sufficiency and clarity of privacy disclosures, particularly in the context
of the other information already available about an individual which
must be aggregated to properly evaluate the mistake. Moreover, even if
they were, nullifying a contract ex post, once the information has been
transmitted and the privacy lost, is far from an ideal solution.

98. See supra Part II.
99. See supra Part III.A.
100. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 407 (1889).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 414–15 (“If the claimant knew that a clerical error had been committed, of which the
agents of the government were ignorant, and deliberately intended to take advantage of the error to
obtain the execution of a contract for the payment of so grossly unconscionable a price, or if the facts
were such that he must be held to have known that their action, if understandingly taken, would be in
palpable dereliction of their duty to their principal, and, notwithstanding, sought to profit by it, the
character of the fraud, so far as the claimant is concerned, is not changed by the fact that such action
was the result of the negligence or mistake of the government’s agents, untainted by moral turpitude
on their part.”).
103. Indeed, as the quote in footnote 102 makes clear, the court in Hume interpreted the doctrine
of unilateral mistake as a manifestation of the unconscionability doctrine. Id. at 414.; see also 7 JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, supra note 97 (“Hume demonstrates that relief for unilateral mistake descends from the
doctrine of unconscionability.”).
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C. REGULATORY APPROACHES
A much more straightforward approach is to regulate consumer
privacy directly.104 As previously discussed,105 ISPs currently face far less
regulation than companies such as Alphabet and Facebook, despite the
fact that ISPs are positioned to collect far more consumer data. This is
problematic. The FCC implicitly recognized this, and crafted the nowdisapproved FCC Privacy Order. While a loss for consumer privacy, this
action presents an opportunity to craft a more effective regulatory
structure. In addition to relying on default rules, this structure should
address consumers’ NBLLN.
Because Congress disapproved the FCC Privacy Order through the
Congressional Review Act, the FCC and other federal agencies are now
barred from putting forth similar regulations.106 Regulations addressing
consumers’ NBLLN in the internet privacy context are likely to fall into
this category. As a result, such a regulation would need independent
Congressional authority.
Work by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar has shown that default rules are
largely ineffective in the context of consumer contracts.107 This is
particularly true in the privacy context.108 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar give
several explanations for this. Crucially, they note that consumers may
simply lack the information that they need in order to make adequate
opt-out decisions.109 Strandburg has also argued that the personal data
market works differently from standard markets.110
In contrast to Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, the problem that we call
attention to operates even when individuals have all the necessary
information, and they are fully aware of their preferences. In contrast to
theirs, our model is built on the assumption that individuals suffer from
a specific cognitive biasNBLLN. As such, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar
invoke a number of different deviations from rationality, while we are
relying entirely on one specific one (that individuals suffer from NBLLN).
On the one hand, this means that our analysis rests on the validity of that
assumption. On the other hand, the parsimony of our assumptions
104. Strandburg, supra note 15, at 165–72 (arguing that neither notice and choice nor a more
robust consent regime can overcome the basic problems of behavioral advertising business models).
105. See supra Part I.B.
106. See supra Part I.A.
107. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Optimal Defaults in Consumer Markets, 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. S137, S138–39 (2016) (noting that that consumers often ignore their own preferences and may
not always understand default provisions).
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See Strandburg, supra note 15, at 130–52 (“[U]nlike the payment of money in an ordinary
retail transaction or the disutility imposed by broadcast or contextual advertising, data collection does
not occur at a ‘point of purchase.’”).
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means that we are more insulated from the standard critique of “fishing”
for biases.111 While we do not object to their assumptions, we do not rely
on them in our framework.
Our framework shows that changing the default is not, on its own,
enough. The problem is neither that consumers have limited attention
(and are therefore not paying sufficient attention) nor that the default
rules are “sticky” (perhaps because the default is interpreted as a
suggestion, or because consumers simply do not understand the
contract). Nor is it even necessarily that consumers do not know what
information is already out there.112 Rather, the problem is consumers’
inability to accurately estimate the incremental value of their
information. Any direct regulation that addresses this issue should
include provisions that reduce their NBLLN bias.
To see how to do this, we can return to the distinction we drew
between transparency duties and consent duties in the FCC Privacy
Order. In light of consumers’ NBLLN, any duties related to transparency
must be designed in a way that heightens their ability to provide truly
informed consent to an opt-in or opt-out.113 An NBLLN-robust disclosure
is one that would allow such a consumer to understand what the
information actually means in the context of all the other information
being collected.
We will now sketch out the key attributes of an NBLLN-robust
privacy disclosure. We do so in three sub-parts. The firstthat the
disclosure be clear and simple, and that it use examples that are easy for
the reader to understandis not unique to the NBLLN context. Rather,
it follows existing “best practices” across the consumer contracting
spectrum, and can be understood as a baseline upon which one must
build the NBLLN-robust disclosure. It is, in other words, necessary but
not sufficient. In contrast, our proposals in the next two sub-partshow
pieces of information combine and how classes of information
accumulateare tailored to the NBLLN context. Finally, the last sub-part
brings these elements together, and discusses the limitations of existing
proposals.

111. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
112. See Strandburg, supra note 15, at 167 (explaining the problem of consumer uncertainty and
stating that “[s]ince the market fails because of the impenetrability of data practices and the
interconnectedness of information, the goal should be to do two things: incentivize data practices that
are not impenetrable and disentangle the collection of data associated with different online activities,”
and that “data practices should be such that consumers have an intuitive sense of what is going on with
their data”).
113. See generally Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 64.
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Starting Point: Clear and Simple Disclosures

The first step in achieving an NBLLN-robust privacy disclosure is
describing the informativeness of the personal data collected from
consumers in a way that is clear and easy to interpret. In other words, to
address the accumulation problem that our model describes, one must
first address the broader problem of disclosures that are written in terms
that not even a fully rational individual could understand. This
suggestion does not arise from our model but rather forms a backdrop
for the remainder of this discussion. The notifications mandated in the
FCC Privacy Order did not achieve this. While they would have required
ISPs to disclose the data being collected from consumers, they would not,
on their own, have been enough to solve the underlying informationprocessing problem in the face of NBLLN.
For notifications to be useful, they must address not only what
information is collected but also the significance of such information. For
consumers, it is not the same to read, “We will collect geo-location
information” as it is to read, “We will collect geo-location information;
this will tell us where you are accessing the internet from.” Moreover,
even a non-NBLLN consumer is likely to benefit from clear and simple
disclosure.
To make these disclosures effective, examples could be added about
how the information collected can be used to learn about the consumer.
While examples are useful to both NBLLN consumers as well as to nonNBLLN consumers, they may be particularly useful to consumers with
NBLLN, since the main problem these consumers have is one of
processing information correctlythey do not know how to aggregate
the information available.114 Because examples are essentially “preprocessed” information, they can short-circuit this bias. For example, it
is not the same for consumers to read, “We will collect geo-location
information” as it is to read, “We will collect geo-location information;
this will tell us where in the world you are when the app is running.” Like
the use of clear and simple disclosures, the suggestion of using examples
does not directly follow from our model. Rather, it forms part of a
“baseline” upon which we build in the next two sub-parts.
2.

How Information Can Be Combined

What is specific to our model is the way in which the data collected
can be aggregated with other data to learn about the consumer. This is
114. See Strandburg, supra note 15, at 98 (explaining that “imperfect consumer information about
the potential harms of data collection, company data practices, and means to mitigate data collection
combine with the properties of information aggregation and with common behavioral economics
concerns to undercut the market’s responsiveness to consumer preferences”).
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where the problems specific to NBLLN begin to manifest themselves.
Take the aforementioned example of geo-location. For consumers, it is
not the same to read “we will collect geo-location information” as it is to
read “we will collect geo-location information; this can be combined with
geo-location information from your other devices and publicly available
information and will tell us when you are at home, at work, or at a store.”
The first does a good job at conveying the information clearly and
reducing the information asymmetry between the company and the
consumer about collection practices, but the second also explains the
meaning of how different signals combine. With the first version, the
consumer would know that her geo-location is being tracked, but she
might not realize how easy it is to aggregate this with information about
her home and work address to know how much time she spends at the
office.
Part of why it is so difficult to calculate the value of one’s information
is that, oftentimes, the value of information is not linear. Information
often has synergies, and the value of a package of information is more
than the sum of its parts. The nine digits of one’s social security number,
for example, are much more valuable than nine times the value of each
digit.115 Therefore, the value (or harm) of a particular piece of information
can be very different depending on the exact combination of the other
pieces of information that are already known.116
That being said, disclosure of what is already known is not enough
on its own. While such a disclosure may help ameliorate consumers’
general confusion, it does little to mitigate their information aggregation
problem. In other words, even if an NBLLN consumer was fully aware of
everything that Poodle knew about her, she would still make the cognitive
mistakes that cause her to undervalue her information.117
Instead, an effective disclosure regulation must help consumers
understand how the next package of data will be used. For example, using
geo-location once more, instead of “we will collect geo-location

115. For a similar observation, see Strandburg, supra note 15, at 130–152 (“[I]t is nearly impossible
for a consumer to estimate the increment of expected harm associated with a given instance of data
collection.”).
116. As others have pointed out, in addition to the problem that we focus on, consumers under the
current regulatory regime have no way of knowing what information is already known about them. See
Strandburg, supra note 15; see also Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security
Numbers from Public Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 10975 (2009); Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701
(2010); Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, De-anonymizing Social Networks, 2009 IEEE SYMP.
ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 173 (2009); Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization
of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. SECURITY & PRIVACY 111 (2008).
117. In fact, as noted above, our argument applies even when the NBLLN consumer is fully aware
of what Poodle knows about her prior to the disclosure of interest. See supra Section II.C.
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information,” consumers could read, “we will collect geo-location
information; this can be combined with geo-location information that we
collect from others, and can allow us to learn who you are spending time
with, how much time, and where.” Just as the last example showed how
to help a consumer aggregate different pieces of information that she
already knew the company had, this disclosure helps her understand how
the package of information aggregates with other information that the
company will havewhich might be more challenging for her if she is not
paying attention. With the first disclosure, the consumer learns she is
being tracked and, by extension, would know that her friends’ geolocation is being tracked as well, but she might overlook how these two
pieces together can reveal much more meaningful information about her.
These altered disclosures directly target the NBLLN bias identified in our
model.
3.

Classes of Information

Finally, consumers who are subject to NBLLN are also likely to
misunderstand the interplay between different classes of information,
which goes a step beyond understanding how to aggregate different
packages of the same type of information. This is problematic: for
example, the value of knowing exactly where the consumer is depends on
whether the observer also knows what the consumer is doing when she
is in each location.
Due to NBLLN, consumers make systematic errors when it comes to
understanding how the different types of data fit together, and how clear
of an image they can create. It follows from our model, then, that
consumers will benefit from specific disclosure about how the
information fits together. One example of this is what computer scientists
call sensor fusion, which describes how different types of data collected
from wearables and smart home devices aggregates to form new types of
information that are hard to predict for a non-expert.118
For example, consider how the prior example of geo-location could
combine with other types of information. Instead of adding a statement
in the privacy notices, complying with the clarity requirement, stating
that, “we will collect data on geo-location, web browsing history, app
118. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 120 (2014) (explaining that “[t]he
technical problem created by the internet of [t]hings is that sensor data tend to combine in unexpected
ways, giving rise to powerful inferences from seemingly innocuous data sources”); Andrew Raij et al.,
Privacy Risks Emerging from the Adoption of Innocuous Wearable Sensors in the Mobile
Environment, CHI 2011 11, 11 (2011) (explaining that “seemingly innocuous data shared for one
purpose can be used to infer private activities and behaviors that the individual did not intend to
share.”).
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usage history, and content of communications,” a consumer could read,
“we will collect data on geo-location, web browsing history, app usage
history, and content of communications. For example, this will allow us
to learn where you are every time you open the app, and what websites
you looked at before and after you used the app. It will also allow us to
record the details of your app usage habits, when you communicate with
other individuals through the app, and the full text of any conversations
you have using the app platform.” This might sound like new
information, but it is not. It is simply manifesting how the different types
of information can be aggregated. This modification in the privacy notice
would help consumers overcome the NBLLN and better understand the
implications of a decision to disclose.
4.

Impact on Existing Notices Literature

This discussion also points to an important implication in the
extensive literature on the effectiveness of notices. While many scholars
have called for more notices to consumers as a way to increase
transparency,119 another stream of literature has suggested that notices
do not effectively increase consumer awareness.120 Indeed, empirical
evidence has shown that simplifying disclosures has no effect on
consumer awareness, suggesting that complexity in language is not the
main driver.121 Moreover, other empirical work suggests that privacy
language in itself is irrelevant, which in turn suggests that consumers do
not react to different kinds of language.122

119. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1047–59 (2011) (proposing visceral notices for privacy); see also Paula J. Dalley, The Use
and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (2006) (noting the
provision of notices as a common method for regulation); William M. Sage, Regulating Through
Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999) (explaining
the provision of notices as a common method for regulation in medicine).
120. See Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent,
PROC. ENGAGING DATA F. (2009); Kirsten Martin, Do Privacy Notices Matter? Comparing the Impact
of Violating Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on Consumer Trust Online, 45 J.
LEGAL STUD. S191 (2016) (using a vignette study to show that formal privacy notices actually reduce
consumer trust on a website); see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008) (showing the time and energy
needed to comprehend privacy policies); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the
Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 139 (2006) (explaining the limits of a disclosure-based policy generally and suggesting direct
conduct regulation through the example of securities).
121. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An
Experimental Test, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S65–66 (2016) (finding that best-practice simplification
techniques have little or no effect on respondents’ comprehension of disclosures).
122. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to
Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69, S92–93 (2016) (testing language in privacy policies).
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Our contribution provides a unified framework for understanding
these results. Thus, the disagreement between proponents and detractors
of notices as a means to help consumers could be due to the fact that
effectiveness depends on the kind of notification and, more specifically,
whether this notification effectively targets consumer bias.
CONCLUSION
Like most people in most situations, online consumers are not
perfectly rational regarding their privacy choices. One central deviation
from rationality is Non-Belief in the Law of Large Numbers. This leads
consumers to make suboptimal choices in decisions that involve
aggregating different pieces of information about them. In short, people
are bad at estimating how these pieces of information combine. They
suffer from a form of information overload, and end up with biased
beliefs.
We discuss this behavioral fact in the context of ISP tracking and the
disapproved FCC Privacy Order and demonstrate the extent to which
consumers are unable to accurately estimate how much ISPs can learn
about them based on their data. This fact provides both a foundation for
regulatory intervention and suggestions for the form that these
interventions should take.
This fact is relevant for any policy that wishes to address consumer
privacy in a behavioral world. While it is particularly important in the ISP
context, the implications of NBLLN for consumer privacy are relevant for
all companies working with behavioral profiling. Forbidding the practice
or forcing an opt-in consent will miss the mark, just as simply applying
contract law principles is unlikely to be effective. Instead, a better way
forward is through direct privacy regulations that enhance
understanding. This approach would increase consumer welfare while
maintaining profitable and legitimate business strategies.
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